The main portion of the 8^th Division reached Brest on the night of 17-18 Aug. It relieved the 6^thArmored Division which moved south to Lorient. The 8^th Division started to develop the situation by sending out patrols to locate the German defensive lines. On 20 Aug. the 2^nd Infantry Division moved in on the left flank. Soon afterwards the 29^th Infantry Division arrived to take up a position on the right flank.

While setting up their positions one of the battalion surgeons and nine of his medics wandered too far into German territory and were captured. They were taken to a chateau in Brest where they claimed they were wined and dined to show how well the Germans in the city lived. However, the men all developed a severe case of diarrhea from the food. They were returned to American lines with General Ramcke’s compliments, and his comment that he was so well-equipped he did not need the additional medical assistance.

On 21 Aug. the 8^th stopped their screening activity outside the city and prepared for the assault. A few small scale-attacks were made to test the German defenses and move forward to better positions. For the most part this fighting was very similar to the hedgerow combat of Normandy, except here the Germans had plenty of time to survey the terrain and dig in. The Germans knew the land very well and could drop their mortars on any suspected American position with deadly accuracy. The veterans of this fight all recalled the kettledrum sound of the German mortars firing. Every major terrain feature, or hedgerow corner, was zeroed in on by the German mortars.

With patrols operating on both sides, there was always a possibility of running into the enemy behind your own lines. Walking back to his company one day, Lt. John O. Gawne was suddenly confronted by a German with an MP-40. The German opened fire and, as the machine pistol sprayed back and forth, the bullets miraculously passed to both sides of the American officer who was able to rush his enemy and knock the gun from his hands.

 On the night of 24 Aug. both the13^th and 28^th Infantry Regiments attempted to infiltrate through the German outposts in preparation for an attack the next day.  They were to move up to the creek that runs just south of Gouesnou.  The main attack planned for 24 Aug. had been postponed 24 hours due to the shortage of artillery ammunition.  At 1300 hrs. on 25 Aug. the attack began and was supported by heavy artillery, plus shelling from the HMS Warspite which fired six missions of 50 rounds each. Four fighter-bombers were on alert per division and 32 battalions of artillery supported the whole American line. Even with all this support the Germans were able to hold their positions against the 2^nd and 8^th Divisions. In the 13^th Infantry sector 1/13^th on the right was engaged in a bitter fight for the town of Bohars, while 2/13^th was caught up in a fight for Hill 88. Both of these areas were stubbornly defended by German paratroopers.

Hill 88, named that by the GIs for the number of 88mm guns located there, is just northeast of Keranchosen. It probably didn’t have any actual 88’s there, but it did have four 105mm antiaircraft guns that were just as deadly against ground targets. The hill looks out over the Penfeld River, which is more the size of a stream at this point. The Americans had to cross 600 yards of open ground, against heavy machine gun and mortar fire, to get to the German positions. On top of the steep slopes the Germans were well dug in. The fight for Hill 88 took more than 30 hours, during which time the troops of both sides became intermingled and, at times, some of the companies were cut off.

 At first both the 1&2/13^th were pinned down trying to cross the open ground. One company was unable to get 200 yards past their line of departure. About 1730 that night one platoon was able to cross the Penfeld. They were able to take some of the pressure off their comrades and the rest of the Americans were able to get to the hill about dusk. The left flank of the hill was exposed to German machine gun fire so American casualties could not be evacuated. The entire position was covered with German trenches and emplacements, and the fight for the Hill 88 resembled the trench fighting of the First World War. Grenades were the main weapon; soldiers were forced to keep hauling sandbags filled with 60 pounds of grenades across the open area and up the hill to keep their comrades supplied.

The first squad to get to the top of the hill was led by S/Sgt. Needham Morris. After numerous German counterattacks Hill 88 was finally in American hands by the night of 26 Aug. On 27 Aug. all of the objectives in the 13^th Infantry sector had been captured and the men were told to dig in and hold while the rest of the line moved up. The artillery ammunition shortage prevented another major assault, so until the end of the August the men essentially held their ground while sending out numerous combat patrols into no man’s land. The 12^th Engineers moved up behind the front lines and built a bridge across the Penfeld River so tanks and TDs could be brought up in support.

On 26 Aug. a curious incident was reported by the 13^th Infantry. Previously, there had been numerous reports of Germans attempting to enter the American lines dressed as GIs. On this day the 13^th Infantry claimed to have killed four Germans dressed in American uniforms. Warnings were sent out to all Allied units in the Brest area to be on their guard. Sightings of Germans in American uniforms increased over the next few weeks, but an official investigation by the 8^th Infantry Division Adjutant General’s office was unable to find any evidence that this was happening. Curiously, no more mention is made of the supposed four dead Germans and it may be that they were in reality Americans, possibly from a different unit, killed trying to reenter their own lines.

On the left the 2&3/28^th Infantry had made slow progress pushing through the hedgerows. On 25 Aug. the 28^th was able to move 200 yards past the Penfeld River, and another few hundred yards the next day. The 3/28^th had suffered a great many casualties, mainly from German artillery and mortar fire, so all three battalions of the 28^th were committed to the attack on 27 Aug. in an attempt to make some headway. 

Perhaps the most memorable incident to happen to the 8^th Division at Brest took place when the 28^th Infantry was trying to push forward to straighten the division lines.   On the night of 29 Aug. companies E&G of 2/28^th infiltrated behind the German lines, but were cut off. After holding their ground as long as possible the two rifle companies were forced to surrender. Most histories about Brittany mention that two companies of the 28^th Infantry Regiment were captured just north of Brest, but not even the official U.S. Army has the story correct.

According to the regimental history, upon which most others have relied, a truce was held in front of the 28^th Infantry lines to allow both sides to pull out their wounded and dead. According to the story, the Germans took advantage of this truce to infiltrate some paratroopers behind the American lines. Examining the battalion records and questioning veterans from these companies shows this is not what happened.

2/28^th had run up against some strong defenses in the previous days, but the men had noticed that the Germans kept their emplacements to the sides of the fields next to the hedgerows, generally in the corners. A plan was developed to move two full infantry companies through the center of a field during a dark night. They planned to capture an area to the south of Kergroas, which would deny the Germans observation of the regimental area. About 0200 hrs. on 29 Aug. both Company E, commanded by Captain Charles Tisdale, and Company G, Commanded by Captain Burke, began to move in single file right down the center of a large field. Captain Burke had just joined the company the day before so he told Lieutenant Rossini, who had previously been commanding the company, to continue to run things while he got acclimated. The men were ordered to keep their rifle safeties on and to only use the bayonet until daylight. Both companies were to move to their objectives behind the German lines and dig in for an all around defense. Company F would follow them later at dawn to clear any Germans that had been by-passed.

At this time all of the 28^th Infantry rifle companies were on the line, except for F/28^th which served as the regimental reserve. The 3^rd Battalion was to the left and the 1^st Battalion was on the right flank.   Both E&G Companies infiltrated to their positions with only one casualty. At 0215 hrs. a German machine gun fired out across the field wounding one man. He did not cry out, and the infiltration continued until all were in position. At 0545 G Company called in on their SCR-300 radio saying they were in position. At 0630 Company E also reported they were ready. Not until 0700 hrs. did the Germans discover the Americans behind their lines. At that time they started to probe the American positions to determine their strength.

The area that E&G were in was relatively small and the men were dug in, in small groups. When Lt. Rossini’s radio went out he was close enough to yell directions for artillery support over to Captain Tisdale, who relayed them on his radio. The previous day the Germans had captured an American Sherman tank that had bogged down in the area. Now they turned this tank against the cut off Americans. Relaying instructions, Rossini and Tisdale were successful in bringing down artillery fire on the tank.  Suddenly they were told that due to the ammunition shortage they could get no more assistance from the artillery.  Captain Tisdale was later told by a German officer that they were listening in to the American radio communications and once they heard that there would be no more artillery support they pressed the attack. As he walked back a prisoner Tisdale personally witnessed the Germans listening to American transmissions at their command post.

The key to breaking the American positions proved to be the captured Sherman. The Americans had not expected to run into any tanks so had left their bazookas behind. Attempts by F/28^th to get a few bazooka teams to the besieged men proved futile.  The besieged men had only a handful of antitank rifle grenades (in the E/28^th sector there was an unconfirmed report that the men had knocked out one tank, probably a self-propelled gun). Tank destroyers were brought up to try and target the German armor, but they could not move up close enough to get a shot due to the intervening terrain.

A few men tried to knock out the captured Sherman. Pfc. Willard Jones and Sgt. Walker jumped out of their foxholes and climbed onto the tank. Jones pounded on the hatches with a grenade trying to find a way to toss one inside, until German machine gun fire sprayed the tank and wounded him. Private X actually shimmied out on the tank barrel to stuff a grenade down the muzzle. Just as he got near the end of the tube the main gun fired and the concussion stunned and knocked him off.  Captain Tisdale took an antitank rifle grenade and tried to work his way around the side of the tank for a shot against the thinner armor. Without warning a German paratrooper appeared out of the darkness and put a machine pistol to his ribs. Unable to fire back due to the grenade mounted on his weapon, and with a German gun stuck in his side, Tisdale had no choice but to give up.  At 1218 hrs. Battalion headquarters reported that they had lost radio contact with both of the companies.  As the Americans were herded together, Pfc. Jones turned to Tisdale with tears streaking down his face and said, “I tried Captain, I really tried, but I just could not knock out that tank.”  Both Pfc. Jones and Sgt. Walker would later be awarded the Silver Star for their efforts.

At 1245 hrs. men from the Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon reported that they could see a large group of Americans being marched down the road towards Brest. An artillery observer reported this on the corps radio net so that no artillery units in the area would mistake them for Germans and start shelling.  The loss of the two companies left a weak spot in the American lines and the Germans attempted to break through it. Every man from the 2^nd Battalion, including the cooks, were called up to man the defenses.  With assistance from A/28^th and the 2^nd Battalion A&P Platoon the lines were held and the German attack was driven off.  The lost companies were soon reconstituted from 247 green replacements rushed up. The few experienced Officers and NCOs  remaining in the 2^nd Battalion were shuffled around to try and get a mix of experienced men in all companies.  

For cutting off the American penetration and capturing what was reportedly close to 500 Americans,  Major Reino Hamer, commander of the First Battalion, 7^th FJ Regiment, would receive the Knight’s Cross. There are claims that the Germans purposely hid in their foxholes, allowing the Americans to pass them by, and then cut them off. The evidence does not support this, and both veterans’ memories and official records support the fact that the Americans had successfully infiltrated the German lines at night and were cut off when Company F was not allowed to put its full strength into the follow-up.

 The problem was that Company F, under command of Captain Frank Gray, was the only company the entire regiment had in reserve. Captain Gray was only allowed to move forward with his 3^rd platoon, commanded by Lt. Jonekait, which became stuck in the town of Kergroas. The Germans were defending in buildings with thick stone walls, with deep trenches around them. Afterwards, Gray stated that if he had been allowed to use his entire company he would have been able to break through.

The story of the truce actually comes from the 3^rd Battalion sector. On the same night as the 2^nd Battalion infiltration, the 3^rd Battalion had also been attempting a night attack, but ran into a minefield. After the first man tripped a mine the Germans were alerted and opened up. The 3/28^th was driven back, leaving a number of wounded and dead in front of the German lines. At roughly 1015 hrs. the commander of K/28^th, Capt. Clarence Hollingsworth, called back to battalion headquarters saying that two German medics had come forward, accompanied by a wounded American, to say that there were a number of casualties lying between the lines. They asked for a truce to allow both sides to remove the dead and wounded.  The offer was accepted by the battalion commander and the three aid men attached to K/28^th went out to recover their wounded. They reported that the German medics were helpful in pointing out where the Americans lay.

The terms of the truce were that there was to be no firing in the battalion area. At 1105 hrs. some small German mortars from outside the area began to shell Company K.  His aid men were still working between the lines, so Hollingsworth sent one of the German medics to stop the mortars. As soon as the German reached the mortar position the firing stopped. Before the truce ended the German medics returned to say they had been ordered to bring back the American casualty that had come with them, as he was technically their prisoner. Hollingsworth refused.

A few minor attempts by the Germans to take advantage of the truce were noted. Two Germans removed some ammunition from a nearby knocked out American tank. Another German soldier left his dugout and retrieved a machine gun that had been dropped in the open. A German naval officer walked out between the lines, probably to examine the terrain. There is no evidence in the battalion or regimental records that this truce was used by the Germans to capture E&G/28^th. The only effect the truce may have had on the fate of the two companies was that it prevented the 3rd Battalion from attacking in support of them. However, in the 3^rd Battalion records there is no mention of any request for such help, or that they felt under pressure to come to the aid of the two companies.  It was the 1^st Battalion, on the right, that had attacked forward towards E&G, but had been stopped by strong German defenses.  The regimental records state, “Conflicting reports regarding enemy patrols and infiltrations were received throughout the day, none of them were confirmed.”  Most of these were probably Germans attempting to move into the vacated E&G company positions.

For some reason the truce would be used to explain how two companies could be captured. An order was issued from the division commander that no more truces would be allowed unless he approved them. It was probably easier to blame the capture on Germans using a truce, than on the failure of the rest of the regiment to break through to them, or the lack of artillery support.  Col. Bailey, the 2^nd Battalion commander, was relieved that morning. The next day the regimental commander, Col. K.S. Anderson was replaced by Col. Merrit E. Olmstead.  It should also be noted that Captain Hollingsworth was considered a superb officer and would rise to the rank of Lt. Col. before being killed near the end of the war. He would not have fallen for a German ruse.

It was not until November 1944 that the official Adjutant General’s report on the matter would conclude that the truce had no bearing on the capture of the two companies. Although the official document requests that the unit records be corrected to reflect this, it was never done and the incorrect story was entered in the history books.

In front of Brest

On 1 Sept. the 121^st Infantry launched a limited attack on the Fourneuf Ridge. This was in conjunction with an attack on the left flank by the 2^nd Infantry Division.  The town of Kergoas was shelled with 600 rounds of 81mm mortars, 1,600 rounds from 60mm mortars, and 400 rounds of white phosphorus from 4.2” mortars.  Afterwards I/121^st was able to occupy what was left of Kergoas without much trouble.

Supporting fire from the 13^th Infantry enabled the 121^st to make a moderate advance, but two hills (80 and 97) remained in German hands preventing further advances.  The next day both the 121^st and the 9^th Infantry (2^nd Division) again worked as a team to force their way onto Hill 80 which dominated the 121^st sector.  The 121^st recaptured an American Sherman tank that the Germans were using, possibly the one involved with the capture of E&G/28th. When the German crew was pulled from the tank one of them was wearing an American uniform. Later in the day another captured American tank was discovered as the division moved forward. Five men were injured when they set off a booby trap hidden inside.

At another point Sgt. Floyd Taylor was severely wounded while trying to cross a gap in a hedgerow. He had been trying to find a better position to set up his gun,  but it had been shot out of his hands. Rather than move back to find an aid man, Taylor crawled up to the German position with a handful of fragmentation grenades and knocked out the German machine gun nest that was holding up his unit, and that had wounded him. Taylor would later be awarded the DSC for this action. It was this kind of individual effort that allowed the Americans to move forward.

By noon the 121^st had again moved on Hill 80, but were soon driven off by heavy artillery fire. On the night of 2-3 Sept. the Americans discovered the Germans had withdrawn to a new defensive line.  A patrol, led by Lt. Joe Stalcup, took up positions on Hill 80. At daybreak they found themselves about to be attacked by American fighter-bombers who had not been told of the advance. They pulled off their shirts and waved furiously to get the attention of the aircraft, which broke off the attack at the last minute. Taking this hill allowed the 9^th Infantry on the left flank to move their line up even with the 121^st.   Due to the shortage in artillery ammunition, continuing the attack was out of the question. The division sat in place for the next four days, but continued to send out patrols to determine where the new German lines were.

The new German position was on the Lambezellec Ridge line running parallel to the front. Patrols indicated the ridge line was heavily defended by the Germans.  In front of the ridge was a small stream that the Americans would have to cross, and it was assumed that the Germans had the area covered with heavy machine gun and mortar fire. The cannon company of the 13^th Infantry was given an eight tube rocket launcher to test, but the results were not very good and the rockets were returned to an ordnance unit. Loudspeakers were set up in the area to broadcast propaganda material to the Germans, but the effort did not result in many surrenders.

On 5 Sept. the 13^th Infantry was strafed by American P-38’s. There were claims that another unit behind them had put out their aerial recognition panels, confusing the pilots as to the actual front line. This happened a number of times in the battle. Units that had been attacked by their own aircraft became so afraid of it happening again they put out their marker panels, not realizing that the pilots would assume they were marking the front line and anyone to their front was the enemy.

 The best area for the 8^th Division to attack was in the 121^st sector, so plans were made to once again to work in conjunction with the 2^nd Division on their left flank. An attack was made on 8 Sept. to capture the towns of Mesmerin and Pontanezen. It was hoped that with these two towns in American hands the 8^th Division could turn to the west and move down the Lambezellec Ridge, without having to attack straight into the German defenses in front of the 13^th Infantry.  On the right the 13^th Infantry advanced a short ways to the last high ground before the ridge. This would allow it to support the 121^st when that regiment turned to the west.

The two regiments jumped off in the morning and, after a twenty minute artillery bombardment, initially made good progress. The 38^th Infantry on the left flank also attacked to add more pressure to the German lines. The 13^th Infantry captured its initial objective in only 12 minutes. Heavy mortar fire delayed the 1/13^th until the mortars of 2/13^th came to their aid. In the afternoon 1/121^st captured the Pontanezen Barracks.  This was an odd kind of homecoming, as the 121^st had been stationed at these barracks back in Sept. 1918.

 By evening both battalions of the 13^th Infantry had taken their objectives.  The 121^st advanced slowly, using flamethrowers to knock out strongpoints. In the 1^st Battalion sector one soldier had pounded on the side of a tank with a rock to get the crew’s attention, then directed them to fire upon the positions holding up his men. Under cover of a smoke screen the 121^st moved forward and by midnight had captured their objective on the ridge. The 2^nd Division was still slightly behind the 121^st to the left flank, so Stroh placed the 1/121^st in  the gap between the two divisions. They would cover the flank until the 2^nd Division moved up, and make sure the Germans did not try to push into the divisional boundary.

On 9 Sept. the 13^th Infantry attempted to pin down the Germans on the ridge, as the 121st started to roll up their flank. Again using smoke to cover the assault the 121^st moved west to Lambezellec in only two hours. As the 121^st continued to press the attack the 13^th Infantry moved forward to within only a few hundred yards of the Penfeld River. The 8^th was now in sight of the Brest city wall.

The next day, 10 Sept., the 13th Infantry moved forward clearing out all German positions in its sector. The 121^st assaulted the city wall at Fort Bougen with two battalions. By 1000 hrs. the 121^st had advanced to the fortress moat, but were forced to withdraw under heavy artillery bombardment. Another assault against the fort was planned for the afternoon, but at the last minute was canceled because the officers realized they needed more support for such a mission.

Fort Bougen was one of the old 17^th century forts ringing Brest. The stone wall was between 25 and 35 feet thick. Outside the fort the moat was 20 feet deep.  The western edge of the fort rested on the Penfeld River, with a steep cliff between the river and wall.  The fort had only one small entrance which passed through two tunnels and over two bridges. A patrol from I/121^st managed to get into the moat. However, for every grenade they tossed over the wall the Germans threw back four and the Americans were forced to withdraw.

Stroh knew that such a fortification could not be taken without strong engineer support, or by shelling the wall with heavy artillery. For this reason the assault was suspended until the artillery had time to target the fortress.  Both 8” and 155mm guns fired directly on the wall and knocked enough rubble down into the moat to allow small parties of infantry to cross, but it was decided that assaulting the fort was not worthwhile and the attack was postponed until the Americans had a better advantage.

On the night of 10 Sept. the 28^th Infantry (less 2/28^th) was pulled from the reserve and sent to the right flank to relieve three battalions of the 29^th Division.  2/28^th remained behind as division reserve.  Again, Stroh was being careful to make sure the boundary where his division tied into a neighbor’s was firmly held. He thought Ramcke might attempt to split the Americans by attacking at the weak point where two divisions came together.

Back at Fort Bougen the shelling by heavy artillery did little damage to the fortress walls. One GI later wrote, “I watched the attack from atop Lambezellec Ridge. The artillery boys certainly showed guts on that day. They would move their pieces right into the open and fire away. They tossed in everything they had, but couldn’t put a dent in the walls. The shells bounced off the walls like steel balls bouncing on a marble floor.”

 Middleton decided that he would hold the line in front of the fort and attempt to penetrate the city defenses to the east in the 2^nd Division sector.  On the night of 11-12 Sept. he withdrew most of the 8^th Division from the front lines by shifting elements of the 2^nd Division to the west. Both the 13^th and 121^st Regiments were relieved by the 9^th Infantry (2^nd Div.) and  pulled back to a rest area at Plouen to reorganize. The 28^th Infantry was left holding their sector of the line until the 29^th Division could advance. During the evening of 11 Sept. 2/28^th was sent off to form a reserve for Task Force A on the Crozon.  They were only to be committed to action in the event of an emergency, such as the Germans attempting to break out of the Crozon. Eventually the 29^th Division advanced to the point where the rest of the 28^th Infantry could be released, and all three regiments of the 8^th Division were sent south to capture the Crozon Peninsula.

Captain Tisdale

The story of Captain Tisdale and the two rifle companies did not end with their capture. They were marched through Brest and taken by boat to a small fishing village on the Crozon Peninsula. Although the village of Le Fou was supposed to be where casualties and POWs were held, period documents claim the men were actually held at nearby Rostellac. Food was terrible there and consisted mainly of horsemeat, sugar beet tops, and  rough brown bread. As much as the men complained about it, it was the same food the Germans ate.  In the POW camp a French barber was allowed to visit the Americans to cut their hair. Security was lax and the barber agreed, for the right amount of money, to help a few men get back to American lines.

The records of the 174^th Field Artillery Group on the Daoulas Peninsula report that one boatload of four escaped Americans arrived on 13 Sept. A second boat arrived the next day and two boatloads on the 15^th. These men were able to provide some valuable intelligence about the locations of German supply routes and an ammo dump on the Isle de Longes.

The Germans sent a few English speaking naval officers to interrogate the Americans in the POW camp. At first they tried to subtly find out where the men had been before Brest by asking how the region compared to various parts of England. Finally one of the German officers broke down and asked in desperation, “Where did you hide your parachutes?” Since no German outposts had spotted such a large number of men moving through their positions, it had been assumed they had to be paratroops dropped behind the lines. 

In the final stages of the fighting on the Crozon, the elderly guards at the POW camp (some of them armed with WW1 French cavalry carbines) fled the area. Nearby was the Isle de Longue, a small peninsula holding a fortified position. The position held a few coastal artillery guns and seemed well-defended. A few of the American POWs wandered up to it, but were sent back by the German commandant with orders to “send up their CO” Captain Tisdale walked up to the fort and was accosted by the English speaking German officer who wanted know “what the hell was he doing, sending men up there without weapons.” Tisdale immediately realized the officer thought they were the advance party of  the American forces fighting up the Crozon. Tisdale asked the German if he was ready to surrender his position, and the German told him that they were well supplied and prepared to hold out for a while longer.

The fort had been bombed the day before with jellied gasoline. Noticing that the German officer was injured and quite leery of some American aircraft in the sky, Tisdale looked at his watch and said, “Well, if you’re not going to give up you’d better get back under cover.” The thought of another air attack was too much for the German, who then agreed to give up. He took his men back into the fort, destroyed their weapons, and marched his men out to surrender.